This section presents the details of the model outlined in section 2.2. We assume a country with a differentiated-good sector and a homogeneous-good sector. Firms in the differentiated-good sector are heterogeneous in productivity. The homogeneous-good sector employs only domestic labor, but firms in the differentiated-good sector can take advantage of lower input prices abroad.
A.1 Preferences and Demand
The total size of the workforce is L, which is also the number of households. Households' preferences are defined over a continuum of differentiated goods and a homogeneous good. In particular, the utility function for the representative consumer is given by
where H denotes the consumption of the homogeneous good, Z = ω∈Ω z c (ω) σ−1 σ dω σ σ−1 is the CES consumption aggregator of differentiated goods, and η > 1 is the elasticity of demand for Z (η governs the substitutability between homogenous and differentiated goods). In Z, z c (ω) denotes the consumption of variety ω, Ω is the set of differentiated goods available for purchase, and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. We assume that σ > η so that differentiated-good varieties are better substitutes for each other than for the homogeneous good. The homogeneous good is the numeraire (its price is 1).
For differentiated goods, the representative household's demand for variety ω is given by z c (ω) = p(ω) −σ P 1−σ P Z, where p(ω) is the price of variety ω, P = ω∈Ω p(ω) 1−σ dω 1 1−σ is the price of the CES aggregator Z, and hence, P Z is the household expenditure on differentiated goods. Given the quasi-linear utility in (A-1), it follows that Z = P −η , and therefore, the aggregate demand for variety ω is given by
The homogeneous good, H, is produced by perfectly competitive firms using domestic labor only. In addition, one unit of domestic labor produces one unit of the homogeneous good. This fixes the domestic wage at 1 as long as some homogenous good is produced, which we assume to be the case. Therefore, the income of each household simply equals 1. We assume that the parameters are such that P Z ≡ P 1−η < 1, so that a typical household has enough income to buy all differentiated goods.
A.2 Production and Pricing in the Differentiated-Good Sector
The productivity of a differentiated-good firm is denoted by ϕ. As in Melitz (2003) , each firm must pay a sunk entry cost of f E in units of the numeraire, after which it will draw its productivity from a cumulative distribution function given by G(ϕ) (the probability density function is denoted by g(ϕ)).
The production function of a firm with productivity ϕ is z(ϕ) = ϕY , with
where L is a composite of inputs produced within the firm, M is a composite of inputs procured from outside the firm, and ρ ≥ 0 is the elasticity of substitution/complementarity between the two types of inputs. We assume that one unit of labor is required to produce one unit of L, so that L is directly interpreted as domestic labor. 
so that a decline in λ makes offshoring more attractive. Note that domestic firms have incentives to offshore only if p M,o < p M,n , which we assume to be the case.
Given the CES function in (A-3), the cost of unit of Y for a firm with offshoring status s is given by
Thus, the marginal cost of a firm with productivity ϕ is co ϕ if it offshores, and is cn ϕ if it does not offshore. Given p M,o < p M,n , it follows that co ϕ < cn ϕ ; that is, the marginal cost of a firm with productivity ϕ is always lower if the firm offshores.
Given the fixed cost of offshoring, f o , there exists an offshoring cutoff productivity level,φ o , which divides existing firms into offshoring and non-offshoring firms: a firm offshores if and only if its productivity is no less thanφ o . With CES preferences, the price set by a firm with productivity ϕ is
Note that p (ϕ) < 0, so that more productive firms set lower prices. Using (A-6) and (A-2), we obtain that this firm's gross profit function (before deducting fixed costs) is
with π (ϕ) > 0 (more productive firms have larger profits).
A.3 Cutoff Productivity Levels
There is a fixed cost of operation, f , in units of the numeraire. Hence, in addition toφ o , there is a cutoff levelφ that determines whether or not a firm produces. A firm with productivity ϕ <φ does not produce because its gross profits are not large enough to cover the fixed cost of operation.
Thus,φ is the level of productivity such that π(φ) = f .
The cutoff levelφ is only relevant ifφ <φ o (otherwise, every producing firm offshores). We assume thatφ <φ o is satisfied, so that the firms with productivities betweenφ andφ o produce but do not offshore. Thus, we get from (A-6) that p(φ) = σ σ−1 cn ϕ . Substituting p(φ) into (A-7) to obtain π(φ), we write the zero-cutoff-profit condition as
(A-8)
Substituting (A-6) and (A-8) into (A-7), we rewrite π(ϕ) as
for ϕ ≥φ, where 1{ϕ ≥φ o } is an indicator function taking the value of 1 if ϕ ≥φ o (and zero otherwise).
A firm with productivityφ o must be indifferent between offshoring or not; that is, for this firm the net profits from offshoring and not offshoring are identical. From (A-9), this indifference condition can be written as
Hence, the relationship betweenφ o andφ is given bŷ
(A-11)
Note that in order forφ <φ o , we need to satisfy BΓ > 1, which we assume to be the case.
A.4 The Free-Entry Condition and Equilibrium
Firms enter as long as the value of entry is no less than the sunk entry cost, f E (in units of the numeraire). Given that the potential entrant knows its productivity only after entry, the pre-entry expected profit for each period is given by
At the end of every period, an exogenous death shock hits a fraction δ of the existing firms and hence, the value of entry is Π δ . The free-entry condition is then
After substituting (A-9) and (A-10) into (A-12), we can solve for the equilibrium cutoff productivity level,φ, from equation (A-13). Under standard conditions, the equilibrium exists and is unique. 1 Lemma 1. The demand for domestic labor of a firm with productivity ϕ ≥φ and offshoring status s, for s ∈ {n, o}, is given by
A.5 Firm-Level Employment and Input Trade Costs
Proof . Given the unit cost for Y in (A-5), Shephard's lemma implies that the requirement of L per unit of output for a firm with productivity ϕ and offshoring status s is given by
A decline in λ implies a decline in the cost of offshoring composite input M . For an existing firm with productivity ϕ that does not change its producing or offshoring status s after a change in λ, its labor demand response is given by
where each ζ ·,λ denotes an elasticity with respect to λ. There are three effects on the demand for domestic labor when λ changes: a competition effect, a substitution effect, and a scale effect. For firms that do not change their producing or offshoring status, these three effects are respectively given by −(σ − 1)ζφ ,λ , ρζ co,λ , and −σζ co,λ in (A-15). The following lemma shows expressions for the elasticities on the right-hand side of equation (A-15), along with other useful results.
Lemma 2. The elasticities of c o ,φ, Γ, andφ o with respect to λ are given by
For ζφ o,λ , it follows from (A-10) that
To obtain ζφ ,λ , note that given the free entry condition in (A-13), it must be true that dΠ dλ = 0. Using equation (A-9) to rewrite Π as
we apply Leibiniz's rule along with B σ−1 = fo f , and equations (A-10) and (A-18) to obtain that dΠ dλ = 0 is equivalent to
It follows that The discussion of the three effects is in section 2.2. After the decline in λ, the firms between the old and newφ die, and the firms between the new and oldφ o start to offshore. For the latter firms, their labor demand changes from L n (ϕ) to L o (ϕ).
A.6 Preferences with Many Differentiated-Good Sectors
As mentioned in section 2.3, the model can be easily extended to include several differentiated-good sectors. The preferences of the representative household are now given by
where H denotes consumption of the homogeneous good, Z j is the CES composite of differentiated goods from industry j, and J is the number of differentiated-good sectors. As described in equation (12), each industry composite is also used as input by non-offshoring firms in all industries.
B Stylized Facts on Job Flows
This section presents some stylized facts about the evolution of job flows in our data. Table B.1 shows the decomposition of job flows in California's manufacturing industry in three-year windows.
As in the work of Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) , we obtain that the net employment changes conceal substantial gross job flows on both the intensive and extensive margins of employment. Figures B.1 and B .2 summarize these results. 1992-1995 1993-1996 1994-1997 1995-1998 1996-1999 then increased substantially during the 2000s. In Figure B .1d we obtain that on average 57% of job destruction is accounted for by the death of firms. Therefore, a first stylized fact about job flows in the manufacturing industry is that from 1992 to 2004, the intensive margin of employment dominates in job creation, while the extensive margin dominates in job destruction.
Lastly, Figure B 1992−1995 1994−1997 1996−1999 1998−2001 2000−2003 Expansions−Contractions Births−Deaths Net Job Creation Figure B .2: Net employment creation in California's manufacturing industry the intensive margin, while the periods of net job destruction were dominated by the extensive margin. Hence, we can write our second and third stylized facts about job flows in the manufacturing industry. The second stylized fact is that the period of net job creation during the dot-com bubble was driven by the intensive margin of employment. From Table B .1, note that the intensive margin improvements over that period were driven evenly by increases in job creation by expansions and decreases in job destruction by contractions. The third stylized fact is that the most important period of net job destruction in the history of the manufacturing industry (at the beginning of the 2000s) was driven mostly by the extensive margin of employment. As seen in Table B .1, the worsening of the extensive margin over that period was the result of reinforcing changes in job destruction by death and job creation by birth.
C Supporting Material for the Empirical Exercise
This section presents further support for the high correlation between manufacturing employment in California and in the U.S., and a fifth robustness check for our estimation.
C.1 Manufacturing Employment at the Six-Digit NAICS Level
In section 3.1.1 we showed that manufacturing employment in California and in the entire country are highly correlated. Using QCEW data at the three-digit NAICS level, which includes 21 
C.2 Fifth Robustness Check: Using Tariffs and Freight Separately
In section 3.2 we compute each industry's final-good trade cost as the sum of the industry's average tariff rate and the industry's average international freight rate. As in Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) , the objective of this approach is to get as close as possible to the iceberg trade cost assumed in heterogeneous-firm models. Nevertheless, it is important to verify that each of these components (tariffs and freight) affect firm-level employment in the expected direction. Also, we can obtain valuable information on whether one of this components is more relevant than the other for firmlevel decisions. Therefore, in this robustness check we consider tariffs and freight separately.
First we estimate the specifications in (17), (18), (19), and (22) by including both tariffs and freight. Table C .1 presents the results. Again, we compare these results against those in columns (2), (4), and (6) in Table 2 , and column (2) in Table 4 . All the coefficients have the same signs as in the benchmark regressions.
For the coefficient on tariffs, the only difference with respect to the benchmark results is in the coefficients for the job-contractions regression, which yield a higher importance for final-good trade costs. However, the net intensive margin results continue to hold (the coefficients are larger in magnitude, though they are less efficient). The death-likelihood regression yields coefficients on tariffs that are larger in magnitude than the benchmark coefficients (about twice as large), and continue to be statistically significant at a 1% level. Notes: All regressions include industry-time fixed effects (defined at the two-digit SIC level), and the establishment's log age. The first three columns include establishment-level fixed effects. The fourth column shows the linear probability model. Industry-level controls (at four-digit SIC level) are the lagged log difference of: the price and value of shipments, the price of materials, total factor productivity, and the industry's employment level. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the four-digit SIC industry level. The coefficients are statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.
For the freight coefficients, the three intensive-margin regressions (expansions, contractions, and net) yield results that are similar in magnitude and significance to the benchmark results. In contrast, the coefficients for the death-likelihood regression are smaller and only one of them is statistically significant (at a 10% level). Notes: All regressions include industry-time fixed effects (defined at the two-digit SIC level), and the establishment's log age. The first three columns include establishment-level fixed effects. The fourth column shows the linear probability model. Industry-level controls (at four-digit SIC level) are the lagged log difference of: the price and value of shipments, the price of materials, total factor productivity, and the industry's employment level. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the four-digit SIC industry level. The coefficients are statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level. Notes: All regressions include industry-time fixed effects (defined at the two-digit SIC level), and the establishment's log age. The first three columns include establishment-level fixed effects. The fourth column shows the linear probability model. Industry-level controls (at four-digit SIC level) are the lagged log difference of: the price and value of shipments, the price of materials, total factor productivity, and the industry's employment level. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the four-digit SIC industry level. The coefficients are statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.
